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Abstract:  One of the biggest concerns in the course of the current financial crisis 
is the role of the dollar and its hegemony in exchange transactions on a global level. 
The financial operations of the parallel or shadow financial system cannot be 
comprehended without understanding financialization and securitization.  “Too 
big to fail, too big to rescue” expressed the size of the “over-the-counter” derivatives 
market.  Institutional investors are responsible for the sovereign debt problem and 
the solution to the crisis. The dollar as the international general equivalent of the 
shadow financial system is of tremendous importance in today’s world. 
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During the last four decades the financial shadow system has been penetrating all the 
monetary circuits around the globe. Not only has the internationalization of capital 
been significantly strong but the profits of the financial actors have improved their 
power over the productive and circulation spheres. The actual financial crisis is the 
expression of the destruction of this monetary power concentrated in hedge funds, 
pension funds and the banks that have been deemed “too big to fail, too big to 
rescue.” Indeed, the question will be if we are really in front of a paradigm change or 
trying to go back to the Bretton Woods Monetary Financial Agreements seven 
decades ago. Therefore, there is an imbalance that exists between the general 
equivalent and other currencies. The dollar, as an international interchange money, 
store value and credit instrument, since the postwar period has been the international 
hegemonic general equivalent. The international financial system transformation, 
from a traditional banking system to a financial shadow system, based in the dollar as 
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a general international equivalent,  induce not only the financial innovation, the 
enormous american dollars around the world and the monetary instability in front 
other currencies such as the euro and renminbi.  
The financial innovation ends in the destructive creation of Shumpeter. Now a 
new regulation must improve the new conduct of the financial actors but also how the 
credit money was created. In this paper the author focuses on the different 
expressions of the financial shadow or parallel system; the imbalances between the 
different currencies and the dollar; the new regulation law and last but not least, the 
debt problems in the Eurozone.  
 
Financial Crisis and Hegemony of the Dollar 
 
The Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008 marks the end of a stage in which 
the hegemony of the United States through its currency, the dollar, put into question 
the bases of a financial system based on deregulation and financial liberalization, 
which allowed the bases to be set for the current economic crisis. There is no doubt 
that the current crisis has exposed the interests of the large mainly U.S. international 
conglomerates and their relationship with the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed).  
Therefore, it could be affirmed that the first stage of the international financial 
system encompasses the system regulated by Bretton Woods from 1944 to 1971. The 
second stage corresponds to the post Bretton Woods financial system, ranging from 
1971 to 2008. In light of the evolution of the international financial crisis, a new 
stage will emerge, based, first of all, on the reordering of the current financial 
regulations mainly centered on the idea of “too big to fail, too big to rescue,” which 
will question the financial regulations established in the 1990s. This involves the 
reconstruction of the international financial system with major intervention from the 
governments and the central banks. Secondly, it involves the policy and resurgence of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) through the G-20 to eliminate the “toxic” 
financial instruments. Thirdly, it includes the weakening of the euro in response to 
the increase in the public debt and fiscal deficit, which allowed for a temporary 
stabilization of the crisis, but that hinders payments to the financial intermediaries, 
and finally, there is the enormous quantities of reserves in dollars held by the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC), that country’s central bank.  
In this whole process and over the course of the past few years the question is 
posed: what possibilities does the dollar have to continue being the hegemonic 
currency in international exchange? The answer is, beyond a doubt, that as the bases 
to resume growth are reconstructed, the dollar will continue being the general 
benchmark. Not only has the Euro put a sword over the economies of the European 
Union but the United Kingdom has also seen its big banks go under. But, at the 
bottom, in the course of the crisis what has been made clear is the strength of the 
financial intermediaries such as the hedge funds and the rating agencies that seek 
financial profitability more than the productive reconstruction of the financial 
circuits. In this panorama the strength or weakness of the dollar is the result of the 
monetary policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve, whose monetary, fiscal, and financial 
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policy seeks to reposition the United States as hegemonic leader in an environment 
intrinsically tied to the interests of the big financial conglomerates. Beyond the 
economic reasons and the alternatives to the crisis there is geopolitical positioning of 
the United States with the dollar as the general international benchmark, strong and 
powerful.  
Regulations have been a preventive medicine of the international monetary 
system to keep the financial circuits healthy, both on a national, as well as 
international level. This is because legislation on regulation and oversight is 
indispensable to achieve economic growth and the equilibrium among the bank and 
non-bank institutions. It could be argued that between 1944 and 1971 the 
equilibrium in the financial markets was sustained effectively and within adequate 
margins, which facilitated the economic growth of the industrial and underdeveloped 
countries. The regulatory laws established in the Glass Steagall Act (1933) helped to 
define the activities of both commercial as well as investment banks in the United 
States. Similar legislation was enacted in the rest of the countries. The inflection point 
occurred when the dollar was devaluated in relation to the gold standard in 1971. 
Since then, the rules of financing had been gradually changing and with this arose 
new parallel structures to grant, create, and distribute credit and with it, the risk of 
the recently created financial instruments in the capital markets. This parallel 
financial system, through structured finances, led to the financial and economic crisis 
that was as deep, if not deeper, than the crisis of 1929. What does this parallel 
financial system consist of? How much assets are involved? Could it be regulated? 
Who would the regulators or the regulatory agency be? What role would the Bretton 
Woods institutions, especially the IMF be willing to play?  
 
Parallel or “ Shadow” Financial System 
 
The parallel financial system is based on the financialization process through which 
all purchase and sale operations involving credit titles are conducted. One of the 
challenges of monetary policy and the lender of last resort (central bank) is the 
enormous liquidity created by the institutional investors whose operations have vastly 
exceeded banks’ traditional operations. Based on the banks’ off-balance sheet 
operations, the bases of the structured finances are established, whose explosive 
growth ended in the financial crisis. The following section will provide a detailed 
explanation of the parallel financial system. 
The parallel or shadow financial system cannot be comprehended without 
understanding financialization and securitization. For Girón and Chapoy (2009, 44-
45)  
 
the financialization process corresponds to the purchase and sale of assets 
or financial securities that can occur in an orderly fashion in the capital 
market. It is the process through which the profitability of financial capital, 
through financial innovation . . . moves beyond the regulatory system 
created through . . . the Bretton Woods institutions (1944). The financial 
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markets imposed themselves on the international financial institutions, 
and a priority emerged for financing through securitization through 
mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, insurance companies and other 
non-institutional investors that became the actors in world financing.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the securitization and financialization process, 
foundation of the parallel system, is intimately related to the Fed’s interest rates. The 
profit cycle of the big conglomerates and the need to avoid a decrease in earnings, had 
a direct impact on the strong expansion of liquidity and risk. Davidson (2009, 4) 
points out that the optimism for a strong economy and a small government, was the 
obvious result of several decades of deregulation and financial liberalization, during 
which, it just so happened, the government budget was increasingly smaller, with the 
exception of military spending, with Greenspan, chairman of the Fed, being partially 
responsible due to his handling of interest rates.  
Greenspan, as former chairman of the Fed, in testimony before the Committee 
on Government Oversight and Reform explained that  
 
this crisis, however, has turned out to be much broader than anything I 
could have imagined . . . on the one hand, the enormous liquidity and the 
fear of insolvency — based . . . in mathematical models and financial 
experts supported by major advances in computer and communications 
technology . . . a process that — handled risk with great solvency and a 
pricing system, whose creators were awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics. 
Today this intellectual edifice has collapsed. (Greenspan 2008).  
 
The Banks and Institutional Investors 
 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the banking crisis affecting U.S. savings institutions 
had cost the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC)1 some $150 
billion. According to Fed regulators, the insolvency of the banks was due to the 
regulatory policies that limited the activities of these institutions.  
This idea was derived from the following hypothesis: (a) the macroeconomic and 
fiscal policies had seriously damaged the health of the banking industry due to 
government regulation, and (b) the banking policies were off the mark, since they 
were based on historical and ideological regulations. Therefore, new regulations were 
required for the banking industry in the new international financial environment 
(White 1993, 2).  
With the beginning of the 1990s it was anticipated that the large banks on a 
national level were about to fall into insolvency. In addition to their financial 
statements being weak, they were very much exposed to highly risky loans (Barth, 
Brumbaugh and Litan 1990, 13). The banks seemed to be an industry in decline, due 
to the competition of non-bank institutions that offered similar financial services to 
those that they were providing. At the same time, the banks continued to crash, and 
the capitalization of the large banks was still weak.  
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As a result, there was an urgent need to reform the regulations that prevailed in 
those years. Traditionally, as part of their assets, banks held the loans granted to their 
clients until the cycle of the credit had concluded. With the deregulations, what the 
banks did was to sell the “pool”2 of their debt to a mutual fund. Subsequently, the 
non-bank intermediary sold the securities in the secondary market. This is what has 
been previously defined as a financialization process. A large part of these credits were 
bundled in the form of synthetic or traditional derivatives.  
 
Derivative Operations 
 
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) estimated the size of the “over-the-
counter” derivatives market3 as $604,622 trillion (June 2009).  
Between 1998 and 2009 the assets of the main U.S. banks performed as follows: 
the largest 25 banks4 saw their assets increase by 204% while the remaining 422 banks 
that followed in order of importance posted 51.54% growth in their assets. In relation 
to derivatives, it should be noted that the 25 largest banks posted 524% growth, while 
the remaining 422 banks saw their derivatives increase 17.19% in value.  
Throughout the period these instruments remained a priority, representing 
between 60% and 70% in relation to the other instruments such as forwards, options, 
and credit derivatives. Even in the crisis period between 2007 and 2008 their annual 
rate of growth diminished marginally and at one point was negative, but they 
recovered in a short period of time, posting growth at the end of 2008. Meanwhile, 
forwards posted a negative variation of -28.51% between 2008 and 2009. In the 2000
–2007 period, options registered a downward trend, and their average variation was    
-5.025%.  
 
Regulation and Oversight Proposals 
 
The plans to capitalize the banks and the strong injection of liquidity, close to $3 
trillion (2007–2009), have put the topic of the regulation of the massive operations of 
the parallel financial system up for discussion. The G-20, the IMF, the UN, the 
Steering Committee, the Warwick Commission, the Bank for International 
Settlements, and the main representatives of the central banks have offered their 
opinions in this respect. But the most controversial opinion may have been advanced 
by Paul Volcker, designated by Obama to preside over the Economic Recovery 
Advisory Board; the Volcker Act was sent to the U.S. Senate at the end of February 
2010.  
Among the most interesting proposals was that of U.S. Secretary of the Treasury 
Timothy Geithner. He discusses the requirements to capitalize the banks with 
standardized limits; that there should be sufficient reserves so that the financial 
groups can themselves absorb the losses; that banks should have enough liquidity to 
face the solvency risk. Finally, he mentions the need to improve the rules for risk 
measurement in the banks’ portfolios and the capital requirements for their 
protection against such risks. Strong restrictions should also be imposed on leverage.  
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The report concerning the financial reform, presented by the Steering 
Committee, headed by Paul Volcker, contained 18 recommendations (Working 
Group on Financial Reform 2010). Drafted by the Commission of the Group of 30, 
the report proposed: (1) redefining the scope and boundaries of the prudent 
regulations; (2) reforming the prudent structure of the regulations, including the role 
of the central bank and the implications of the “lender of last resort,” as well as the 
“safety networks” and the need for greater coordination; (3) improving the 
government’s authority, risk management, regulatory policies, and accounting 
practices, as well as the standards; and  (4) improving the transparency of the financial 
infrastructure agreements.  
 
Euro, Monetary European Union and Central Bank 
 
Was the Euro being well regulated? One of the principal discussions these days is the 
solvency and regulation of the institutional investors. Financial markets, pension 
funds and hedge funds have managed their flows in a very profitable business of 
corruption increasing interest payments not only to governments but to private 
entrepreneurs. Indeed the deepness of the sovereign debt problem won’t be finished 
until the Central Bank renegotiates the decrease of the total amount of debt and the 
interest on the external debt service payment. All of the credits must be involved in a 
long term restructure plan of payments as well. The central bank must act as lender of 
last resort and improve employment through monetary and financial policies. 
During the past four decades, recurring economic and financial crises have 
emerged on an international level in the capital markets’ integrated financial circuits. 
The current debate on regulations is taking place amid serious concerns over 
recurring bank crises. The waves of panic that occurred in 1907, 1928, and 2007 go 
hand in hand with the strong speculation carried out by financial agents such as the 
banks. It should be asked whether it is important to save the big banks, or on the 
contrary, could a regulation be sought that strengthens bank and non-bank financial 
institutions and, of course, the lender of last resort?  
 
Notes 
 
1. The Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) was an institution that administered 
the deposit insurance for U.S. savings and loan institutions. The Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act abolished the FSLIC in 1989, passing its responsibilities to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The FSLIC was created as part of the National 
Housing Act of 1934, in order to insure the deposits in saving and loan institutions. One year later, 
the FSLIC was created to insure the deposits held in commercial banks. It was administered by the 
Federal Home Loan Board (FHLB). In the 1980s, during the savings and loans crisis, the FSLIC 
became insolvent. Several times it was recapitalized with taxpayers’ money, to the tune of $15 billion 
in 1986 and $10.75 billion in 1987. However, in 1989 it was again insolvent and was abolished 
together with the FHLBB, and the responsibilities of the FSLIC were transferred to the FDIC. 
2. A pool consists of government and private securities that form a combination of credits or securities, 
placed for sale to obtain an additional profit. 
3. Markets whose transactions are carried out outside the stock exchanges or organized markets. 
4. Among the most important of which were Chase Manhattan Bank, Citibank and Bank of America. 
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